I am delighted to introduce the seventh volume of the *International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection*. Few areas of human endeavor are as vital as ensuring the safety, security and resilience of the critical infrastructure. The *International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection* provides a venue for framing and addressing the myriad problems involved in critical infrastructure protection. It seeks to raise awareness of the challenges, to nurture scholarly research in the discipline and, most of all, to stimulate the implementation of sophisticated yet practical solutions that weave science, technology and policy.

This issue of the *International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection* has five full-length papers and one opinion piece that showcase the diversity, richness and vitality of the discipline. As always, the articles are important, timely and compelling.

The first full-length paper in this issue, by Rowland et al., focuses on the anatomy of a "cyber power." Cyberspace is a rich environment for the projection of power and influence. Therefore, it is not surprising that "powers" of all types -- from nation-states and multinational companies to criminal organizations and terrorist groups -- are embedding critical aspects of their operations in cyberspace. Cyberspace offers all actors speed and reach, anonymity and protection, and the abilities to participate in virtual economies and wield cyber weapons, all with a low buy-in cost.

Cyberspace and the critical infrastructure subsume each other. One cannot survive without the other, nor can modern society. This is why it is so important to understand the nature of cyberpower and the anatomy of a cyber power. Rowland et al. attempt to clarify these notions. They consider nation-states as well as non-state actors, and articulate the essential components and characteristics required to acquire and maintain cyberpower.

The second paper, by Katina et al., deals with the analysis of interdependency-induced risk in critical infrastructures. Modern society depends on the goods and services provided by critical infrastructures. However, critical infrastructures do not operate as isolated systems, but as interconnected systems that strongly depend on each other. This view is vital in risk analysis because natural and human-initiated events in one infrastructure can induce cascading failures in the other interdependent infrastructures.

Katina et al. conduct a detailed study of infrastructure interdependencies and illustrate how interdependencies can enable the anticipation of risk in critical infrastructures. Using healthcare as an example critical infrastructure, they articulate the implications of interdependencies in healthcare with respect to risk assessment and proceed to formulate an interdependency-induced risk approach for strategic healthcare planning. This extended risk formulation approach should be of interest to policymakers, infrastructure operators and researchers because, by incorporating the structural complexity brought about by interdependencies, the approach can help minimize and/or reduce the probabilities and consequences of cascading failures in interdependent critical infrastructures.

The third paper in this issue, by Tuncer and Le, studies the effect of air travel on the spread of an avian influenza pandemic from the Far East to the United States -- a very timely topic considering that it is now the height of the flu season. The highly pathogenic avian influenza strain H5N1, which first appeared in Hong Kong in 1997, involved bird-to-human transmission, causing a severe disease with 637 cases in 15 countries, including 378 deaths -- a fatality rate of nearly 60%. Avian influenza is one of the deadliest diseases that can jump from animals to humans. Epidemiologists believe that it is likely to cause the next major global pandemic that could kill millions of people.

The 2002 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak demonstrated that international air travel can significantly influence the global spread of disease. Tuncer and Le derive a two-city mathematical model that helps understand the dynamics of the spread of pandemic influenza via air travel, and if the disease will spread and persist or go extinct. Real air travel data is used to model the spread of the disease by individuals infected with pandemic avian influenza. The results of the analysis can help public health officials and policy-makers select the appropriate disease control measures, and provide guidance on where to implement control measures while conserving precious resources.

The fourth paper, by Coppolino et al., describes an experimental approach for exposing vulnerabilities in electric power grids. As smart grids become operational around the globe, securing their control systems becomes a critical task. Compromises of grid monitoring functions could result in potentially damaging effects to power grid operations. This is a major security risk because attacks on electric power grids can dramatically impact virtually all societal activities.

To improve the performance of SCADA and energy management systems, electrical utility operators are integrating emerging technologies such as synchrophasors (or phasor measurement units) and phasor data concentrators for power data collection. Coppolino et al. provide experimental evidence of vulnerabilities in power data collection infrastructures. Some of the vulnerabilities are easily exploited if proper security measures are not adopted and protection devices are not integrated. The exposure comes from traditional problems such as the lack of encryption in communications channels, the lack of input validation and sanitization, and the implementation of weak password policies. The greatest concern is that some of the vulnerabilities are present in a hardened testbed evaluated by Coppolino et al. The vulnerabilities enable common information technology system attacks, such as SQL injection, to be launched against electric power infrastructures, corroborating recent reports about attacks against electric power grids.

The fifth and final paper, by Schuett et al., examines the feasibility of modifying programmable logic controller firmware to execute remotely-triggered attacks. Programmable logic controllers are attractive targets for attackers because they are used in SCADA systems that directly monitor and control processes in the various critical infrastructure sectors. Although attacks targeting SCADA systems have increased, relatively little research has focused on exploring the vulnerabilities associated with the exploitation of field devices. Attacks such as Stuxnet have targeted operating characteristics, but not low-level firmware code. As attacks become more sophisticated, we will certainly encounter increased exploitation of field device firmware.

Schuett et al. evaluate the feasibility of modifying programmable logic controller firmware to execute remotely-triggered attacks. They employ a general method to reverse engineer firmware and determine its structure. After the structure is understood, the firmware is modified to add exploitable features that can remotely disable programmable logic controllers. Important segments of the firmware are described in detail to demonstrate how they can be used in attack development. Finally, design recommendations are provided that can help mitigate potential weaknesses in future firmware development.

A unique feature of the *International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection* is the publication of opinion pieces by scientists and thinkers that discuss significant, topical issues. The opinion piece in this issue is written by Kendal Smith, Education Program Manager at the Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security at the George Mason University School of Law in Arlington, Virginia, where she leads the Critical Infrastructure Higher Education Initiative sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. Smith's opinion piece titled, *Designing Flexible Curricula to Enhance Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience*, describes an important initiative that draws subject-matter experts from academia, industry and government to develop comprehensive graduate-level curricula for professionals responsible for infrastructure security and resilience.

According to Ms. Smith, U.S. Department of Homeland policies have evolved to include an all-hazards approach to critical infrastructure security and resilience across 16 sectors. However, while numerous programs have been developed at educational institutions across the United States, only a small fraction focus on critical infrastructure security and resilience. A 2010 study revealed that, of 785 institutions offering higher education programs in homeland security, only 52 taught courses containing material relevant to critical infrastructure security and resilience. The content and terminology in the courses varied greatly, revealing an obvious gap in U.S. higher educational programs.

Ms. Smith details the strong efforts undertaken by the Critical Infrastructure Higher Education Initiative to address this problem. The initiative has created a vast body of educational resources, including curricular packages, case studies and a library of readings. All the materials are non-proprietary and freely available for use at higher education institutions.

Ms. Smith notes that achieving critical infrastructure security and resilience require cooperation across multiple sectors and at all levels of government and private industry. Successful cooperation in such a heterogeneous pool of professionals is not possible without qualified individuals in each of the relevant areas who, beyond their own specialties, possess the knowledge and skills unique to the operating environment. Comprehensive curricula are needed to ensure that individuals responsible for operating critical infrastructures -- from CEOs to structural engineers -- speak the same language and work together to adapt to new challenges and enhance security and resilience.
